While this list of topics is far from complete, it suggests that contemporary debates in the philosophies of mind, action, and science touch on a variety of aspects of the earlier dichotomy between explanation and understanding. Keeping this in mind is important for at least two reasons. First, it reminds us that from a philosophical perspective the Erklären/Verstehen distinction is richer and more multi-faceted than might appear at first sight, suggesting that perhaps some systematic insights might be gained from investigating the historical precursors and the contexts in which they originated. Second, it raises the question of whether the categories employed by the current philosophical literature may provide us with analytical tools that we can use when entering the thicket of nineteenth and early twentieth-century issues and debates. The essays in this volume are selected to juxtapose precisely these two questions, i.e., (1) what (if any) novel philosophical insights can be gained from analyses of the varied and diverse previous debates about aspects of the dichotomy between explanation and understanding, and (2) what (if any) historical insights can be gained by means of analytical tools taken from current philosophical discussions?
The second question, in particular, raises an important problem for conducting this sort of historical/philosophical enterprise: the worry that by using our contemporary philosophical categories, we are in danger of anachronistically reading issues into the historical debates that did not actually concern the historical actors. We might then assume that our current categories form some kind of teleological endpoint of a historical trajectory. However, if our interest in historical questions is motivated at least in part by a desire to learn something about current debates, then surely we need a language that makes past events and discussions comprehensible and relevant to our present concerns. These are legitimate worries. Ironically, it was precisely these types of questions that were behind some of the nineteenth-century writings in the philosophy of history, which found one articulation in terms of the dichotomy between Erklären and Verstehen. The problem at issue is how to gain knowledge about a subject matter both intimately tied to our own sense of who we are and what we value, and at the same time remote from our current lives and practices. Or, as the issue was put as part of debates about historicism, how can we appreciate the extent to which previous categories may not have been informed by our own values and interests without thereby relativizing those very values and interests, and how can we get interpretive access to the past without assuming that our current categories are at least partially valid? (e.g., Wittkau 1992; see also Jacques Bos's contribution in this volume). In a similar vein, a philosopher who looks at aspects of historical debates about explanation and understanding may worry that she must refrain from any judgment of what is the correct way of thinking about this dichotomy, whereas a historian may worry that such philosophical prejudices might distort the historical narrative.
Several contributions to this volume address these questions, either explicitly or implicitly. Beginning with worries more likely to be formulated by historians, we can in particular identify methodological questions that concern the use of sources. This concern has two aspects. First, can we do justice to the history of a philosophical category -or any category, for that matter -only by looking at historical sources that explicitly addresses this category (for example, in our case, nineteenth or early twentieth-century literature about the distinction between explanation and understanding)? Second, can we do justice to a particular writer's notion of that category by taking at face value what he writes about his own motivation for adopting it? In response to both types of questions, there is by now a consensus amongst many historians of science and of philosophy that (a) intellectual history -like other kinds of history -has to be careful not to uncritically adopt actors' categories, and (b) more generally, even the actors' own thinking about a particular issue has to be contextualized vis-à-vis their other intellectual commitments and interests, as well as the complex conditions that make the totality of their commitments possible. Such conditions include cognitive as well as practical, institutional, and cultural factors. The articles in this volume respond to these challenges in several ways. For example, one author (Christopher Pincock) seeks to read some of the nineteenthcentury philosophical writings about Erklären and Verstehen as standing for a more fundamental problem, which he terms the problem of the "unity of experience". In turn, other authors contextualize aspects of the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy in relation to debates about educational reforms in nineteenth-century Germany (Denise Phillips), controversies about the relationship between science and religion in the wake of the rise of Darwinism (Bernhard Kleeberg), aspects of the material culture of the Austrio-Hungarian empire (Katherine Arens), and a growing appreciationthroughout the nineteenth century -of the notion of individuality, both with respect to persons and with respect to historical events (Jacques Bos).
The philosophical concern with the question of whether an appreciation of the contingent nature of intellectual history forces us to regard our current philosophical positions as unfounded or arbitrary is confronted especially clearly by Christopher Pincock, who tries to strike a middle ground between writing a history of arguments for whatever positions we currently hold and writing a history that makes our current positions entirely contingent on their historical developments. He concludes with a plea for a type of intellectual history that aims at identifying important philosophical problems and keeping a wide range of solutions -both past and present -on the table. In a similar vein, Warren Schmaus's comparative analysis of French and German debates in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries highlights the fact that there is no reason to suppose that a shared set of problems would automatically lead to similar philosophical solutions, thereby also expanding the range of philosophical options available to us. Thomas Uebel's narrative, in turn, shows that even if we restrict our attention to an analysis of developments that took place within one (e.g., the logical empiricist) tradition, we may find that the dynamics of the emerging story provide us with a much more fine-grained picture than standard textbook accounts might suggest.
The dichotomy between Erklären and Verstehen is located somewhere between science and philosophy, in that it expresses philosophical thoughts about the epistemological or methodological foundations of the human sciences. Moreover, it emerged at a time when the line between philosophy and the sciences was less clear-cut and more contested than it is today. Hence, it seems especially clear that if we aim at an analysis of the historical and systematic status of this dichotomy, a combination of approaches from the history of science, the philosophy of science, and the history of the philosophy of science is called for. It is for this reason that the current volume presents a range of articles by authors from different disciplines, where this interdisciplinarity plays out both in terms of the academic training of the contributors (bringing together philosophers, historians, sociologists, and literary scholars), and in terms of their subject matters (social science, psychology, history, theology, philosophy, literature, and intellectual culture). The volume therefore attempts not only to offer different disciplinary perspectives on the history of the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy, but also to overcome a narrow focus on disciplinary histories. In this vein, several contributions offer insights into the writings of well-known figures (such as Wilhelm Dilthey or Max Weber) by relating these writings in novel ways to other academic and/or scientific developments. For example, Michael Heidelberger argues that Max Weber's conception of an understanding sociology (which is often characterized as coming out of an engagement with the work of Heinrich Rickert) was in fact stimulated by the philosopher/psychologist and theorist of probability Johannes von Kries, while Daniel Ŝuber argues that Wilhelm Dilthey's work had a much bigger impact on twentieth-century sociology than is commonly assumed, and Safia Azzouni describes the ways in which Dilthey's theory of poetics helped shape early twentieth-century popular science writings.
Finally, the volume takes a comparative perspective, insofar as a number of contributions compare and contrast the issues discussed, and concepts used, in debates that took place in Germany, Austria, France, Britain, and the USA. In taking this perspective, the volume seeks to highlight commonalities and divergences in the approaches adopted by writers in different countries and national traditions. The contributions of Warren Schmaus and Philipp Müller, for example, bring out the specifics of the French debates, with Schmaus focusing more on differences between French and German debates, and Müller revealing some unexpected commonalities between the thought of Wilhelm Dilthey and Hippolyte Taine. In a similar vein, David Leary traces similarities and dissimilarities between William James and Wilhelm Dilthey with respect to their notions of understanding and explanation, while Roger Smith provides a detailed analysis of the issues that dominated British debates about the relationship between different areas of learning.
Overview of the Papers
In the German context, the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen is usually seen as closely linked to the aim of securing an epistemological basis for the distinction between the Naturwissenschaften and Geisteswissenschaften (the natural and the human sciences). Denise Phillips (University of Tennessee at Knoxville) contextualizes the latter dichotomy by relating it to debates that started in the 1830s, regarding the notion of Bildung, i.e., the question of what constitutes the notion of knowledge and education that was essential to the self-fashioning of the educated middle class in the nineteenth century. Central to these debates, Phillips argues, were the questions of what kinds of personality traits were crucial to being a good scientist, and what kind of training was required to assist the development of such traits. She thereby brings out the close relationship between notions of Bildung (the German term "Bildung" has a double meaning of "education" and "molding") and philosophical writings about scientific methodology. Using as a case study a specific debate in Dresden, Phillips points out that what was at stake were two models of knowledge, one that emphasized the study of texts, and one that emphasized the study of nature. While the former was traditionally more highly valued and deeply rooted in the German tradition of a humanist secondary education, Phillips points to the complex set of circumstances in which the study of nature not only began to become part of the university curriculum (raising the question of whether high school students were adequately prepared), but also began to be organized in local associations for the study of nature, whose members increasingly protested their marginalization by traditional educational culture.
Phillips's contribution provides an important context for understanding the emerging distinction between Natur-and Geisteswissenschaften. It makes clear that the underlying notions of both the natural and the human sciences were in a state of flux, and underwent some changes in the course of the nineteenth century. For example, while we find one of Phillips's protagonists referring to the natural sciences as based in sense experience and the human sciences as allowing for a text-based understanding of the past, Wilhelm Dilthey would later distinguish between the two in terms of a science based in hypotheses (natural sciences) vs. one based in lived experience (human sciences) (see Feest 2007) . This points to an important shift that took place, namely that parts of the human sciences themselves "went empirical". In his contribution, Bernhard Kleeberg (Universität Konstanz) analyzes a particular aspect of this shift, namely the question of how German protestant theologians in the nineteenth century responded to the fact that the new science of evolution was producing an empirically based alternative narrative of the history of the earth and the place of human beings on it. As a consequence, theologians felt themselves in danger of losing their interpretive authority concerning issues of ethics and meaning. As Kleeberg points out, we can make out an overall development, in the course of which theology became one humanity among others, even though many theologians still wanted to resist this conclusion, emphasizing the distinct status of religious experience as the basis of theology. The central thesis of Kleeberg's paper is that in the course of this development, the very notions of meaning and interpretation underwent some changes as theologians developed a sophisticated hermeneutic methodology, which, in many cases, sought to show that science and religion could coexist peacefully. As Kleeberg shows, theologians adopted different strategies in their attempts to reconcile science and religion. Some turned to neo-vitalism in support of the idea that both material and nonmaterial factors contribute to evolution, while others took the position that while science provided explanations of events and phenomena in natural history, it still had to rely on theology to provide an understanding of the symbolism of nature or to interpret the moral narrative inherent in the biblical account of creation.
Like Kleeberg and Phillips, Safia Azzouni (Max Planck Institute for the History of Science) also addresses the issue of how notions of Erklären, Verstehen, and related ideas played out in the cultural and educational context of turn-of-the-century Germany. More specifically, she describes the way in which the literary genre of science popularization constituted an important new model for the presentation and distribution of knowledge. This model, she argues, borrowed significant elements from both the natural and the human sciences, in that it attempted to convey scientific explanations by means of literary techniques, thereby re-creating in the reader a lived experience of the scientific facts in question. As a point of departure, Azzouni takes Wilhem Dilthey's work, Poetik, of 1887, arguing that the ideas expressed there were a major influence on Dilthey's one-time student, the high-school teacher and popular science writer Kurd Laßwitz. While Dilthey had in other places emphasized the gulf between explanation and understanding as constituting an important epistemological difference between the natural and the human sciences, his Poetik posited the notion of lived experience both as an important explanatory concept (i.e., one that explains the poet's creative potential) and as something that enables us to understand that which the poet conveys to us. As Azzouni shows, Laßwitz took this to mean that the poet is ideally suited to evoke in his audience the lived experience necessary for an understanding of scientific ideas. She then provides an illustration of how he applied this idea in his own popular science writings, seeming thereby to bridge the gap between the human and natural sciences.
As laid out in the contribution by Philipp Müller (Humboldt Universität), the French philosopher Hippolyte Taine, like Dilthey and Laßwitz, thought that artistic expression was an important vehicle of psychological insights. Müller reminds us that Dilthey used Taine, along with Buckle and Mill, as a prime example of the kind of positivistic philosophy of history that he rejected. However, Müller argues that in fact Taine's idea of founding history in psychology was closer to Dilthey's conception of the human sciences than is commonly assumed. While Taine did appeal to the role of psychological laws in the explanations of historical events, he in fact viewed the structure of the human mind as resulting from the interplay between mental and historical forces, and, furthermore reflected on the cultural and historical context of the science of psychology itself. Müller places Taine's philosophy of history in its historical context, showing how Taine's views about the necessity to naturalize the human mind have to be read as criticisms of spiritualists' writings, such as Victor Cousin's "méthode psychologique", and that his own outlook on psychology was the result of close intellectual contacts with contemporary novelists and literary critics who emphasized the historical situatedness of human thought. Taine then sought to investigate this situatedness by means of historical studies of artistic products.
The comparison between Taine and Dilthey with respect to the status of psychological laws raises the more general question of the relationship between French and German approaches to the issues we might summarize under the heading of Erklären and Verstehen. This task is taken on by Warren Schmaus (Illinois Institute of Technology). Schmaus argues that while reflecting on differences in the subject matters of the natural and human sciences, French philosophers did not conclude that any significant methodological distinctions should be drawn. In this, he suggests, they differed both from Dilthey, who derived the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen from the different ways in which we gain epistemic access to mind and nature, and from Windelband and Rickert, who derived the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic method from the different scientific goals of gaining knowledge about laws of nature vs. individual events. Beginning with an account of Dilthey's early thoughts on descriptive psychology and his notion of lived experience, Schmaus shows that there were some parallels in the work of various French philosophers, such as the idea that we have direct, unmediated experience of our inner lives. He argues, however, that few in France thought that this implied a distinct foundation for the human sciences. Similarly, while some French scholars distinguished between the nomothetic and idiographic in ways similar to Windelband, they did not argue that this entailed a methodological distinction, since they believed that all scientific knowledge was inductive and hypothetical. Schmaus's paper concludes with a comparison between (the later) Dilthey's method of hermeneutical interpretation and Durkheim's notion of an interpretive social science, pointing to the fact that while Durkheim disagreed with some of Dilthey's most fundamental assumptions (i.e., the idea of grounding the social sciences in psychology), Durkheim nonetheless formulated his social science as an interpretive endeavor.
In his contribution, "Instead of Erklären and Verstehen: William James on Human Understanding", David Leary (University of Richmond) also offers a comparative perspective, by analyzing some aspects of William James's philosophy of psychology. He argues that while James in fact shared with Wilhelm Dilthey some views about the nature of psychology, James never became involved in anything like the Erklären/Verstehen debate. As Leary explains, James seems not to have found such a distinction useful. For James, the question of whether we take an explanatory or a descriptive stance was ultimately a matter of preference vis-á-vis an open-ended, changing world. Leary contextualizes this analysis of James by providing an overview of James's views on human understanding, highlighting some significant biographical factors that may have contributed to James's views, such as his extensive reading of Goethe and Shakespeare and his association with the metaphysical club around Chauncey Wright. As Leary shows, James's views about explanation comes out particularly clearly in his response to the philosopherpsychologist Ladd, who had argued (in a review of James's book Principles of Psychology) that James's approach was not able to provide truly scientific explanations. James's reply suggests that he did think that psychology aimed at providing explanations (by which he meant ultimate descriptions of how things fit in), but that he thought of the actually existing explanatory statements as a provisional body of propositions. Leary concludes with a brief discussion of why Dilthey and James might have been content with such differing conceptions of the nature of science.
The contribution by Katherine Arens (University of Texas at Austin) draws attention to the fact that the notion of understanding cannot be reserved for those who posited it as a distinguishing methodology of the human sciences, to be contrasted with the explanatory methodology of the natural sciences. Positivism, especially in its turn-of-the-century instantiation, explicitly rejected the notion of natural science as providing explanations that appealed to hypothetical constructs. For positivists, such as Ernst Mach, the task of philosophy of science was to provide an analysis of the ways in which our understanding of both the natural and social world is based in our phenomenal experience. Arens argues that Mach's way of thinking was in fact representative of a particular cognitive style that she attributes to features of the Austrio-Hungarian empire (such as its school system). This style, which emphasized historical situatedness as foundational to knowledge, was not, according to Arens, easily reconciled with the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy, at least in the sense in which these notions were employed in the context of German philosophy. Arens examines the work of three otherwise quite diverse theorists (Ernst Mach, Karl Menger, and Alois Riegl), and argues that they shared in common the idea that scientific knowledge is firmly grounded in specific phenomenal experiences, which in turn are tied to specific material practices. Arens refers to this way of thinking about scientific understanding as "materialist phenomenological" and argues that its emergence has to be placed in the context of Viennese culture and history, in which all three thinkers developed their views.
In two complementary papers about British philosophy and the human science in the nineteenth century, both Roger Smith and Christopher Pincock argue that nothing like the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy existed in the English language context. In his paper, "British thought on the relations between the natural sciences and the humanities, c. 1870-1910", Roger Smith (Russian Academy of Sciences) presents a detailed and comprehensive overview of the development and disciplinary formation of what we might today refer to as the human sciences, arguing that (a) the primary concern of English-language writers in the philosophy of scientific knowledge was naturalism, and (b) both proponents and critics of naturalism shared a commit to having their scholarly work provide a moral foundation for society. These concerns are traced back to Mill's 1843 Logic of the Moral Sciences, whose naturalistic outlook, however, was not widely shared until the 1860s. Smith then provides an overview of the development of different humanities disciplines (social theory, philosophy, history, psychology) in the decades following the 1870s, providing both intellectual and institutional contexts for each, and pointing to factors that may have been responsible for the different forms the debates took in Britain, as compared to debates in Germany at the same time. As Smith remarks, it is probably no coincidence that in the 1950s and 1960s, British critics of a positivist philosophy of the social sciences turned to the older German debates for inspiration. There was no prior British tradition to embrace.
In "Accounting for the Unity of Experience in Dilthey, Rickert, Bradley and Ward", Christopher Pincock (Purdue University) approaches the difference between German and English work by asking what was the common philosophical problem to which the German-language Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy proposed to provide an answer, as distinct from answers we find in the English-language context. According to Pincock, the problem may briefly be summarized as that of showing how experience relates to scientific knowledge. He refers to this as the "problem of the unity of experience" and shows that it can be demonstrated especially clearly in John Stuart Mill's phenomenalist philosophy of science. Pincock presents a reading of two German authors (Dilthey, Rickert) and two British authors (Bradley, Ward), according to which they each attempted to tackle the problem of experience in different ways. Dilthey and Rickert, Pincock argues, disagreed fundamentally in several respects, but each end up with a conception of the unity of experience that has as a consequence the distinction between different types of sciences (human vs. natural sciences) and both invoke a notion of understanding as supporting the distinction. In contrast, Pincock argues, Bradley and Ward (while also disagreeing widely) each proposed solutions that did not invoke a distinction between understanding and explaining.
By focusing his attention on the unity of experience rather than Erklären/Verstehen divide, Pincock is also able to draw attention to interesting similarities between Dilthey's and Ward's conceptions of psychology.
As already mentioned, one approach in Germany that attempted to delineate the human sciences from the natural sciences came from proponents of the Southwest school of Neo-Kantians, in particular Wilhelm Windelband and Heinrich Rickert. According to this school, the relevant epistemological distinction was not one between explanation and understanding, but rather between the explanations of individual events and the search for general laws (Windelband used the well-known terminology of "idiographic" vs. "nomothetic" sciences for this contrast). In the view of Jacques Bos (University of Amsterdam) the big category underlying many discussions of the human and natural sciences during the nineteenth century was that of individuality. Bos argues that the notion of historical events as unique was central to the nineteenth-century notion of historicism. While the term "historicism" has different connotations, Bos uses it to refer to a movement that rejected Hegelian and Romantic ideas about the telos of historical developments, instead turning to discussions of empirical methods in the investigation of past events. Bos contends that the depiction of historical events as unique was linked to an insistence on the uniqueness of individual human beings and their central role in shaping historical events. To substantiate his claims, Bos analyzes the work of three important nineteenth-century historicists -Wilhelm von Humboldt, Leopold von Ranke, and Johann Gustav Droysen. He argues that each rejected both Hegelian and positivist philosophies of history, because they implied a disavowal of the idea of individuality. Nonetheless, Bos emphasizes, while agreeing on the importance of individuality, each also championed his own understanding of the concept.
Given the notion of individuality, the question arises whether, and in what way, individual agency can be appealed to when accounting for particular historical or social phenomena, i.e., at what level of analysis should explanatory and/or interpretive efforts be pitched? This question, commonly known as the individualism/ holism debate, was famously addressed in the so-called "Methodenstreit" between the Austrian school of economics (in particular, Carl Menger) and the German school of national economy (in particular, Gustav Schmoller). In her contribution, Filomena de Sousa (Technical University of Lisbon) addresses this debate, arguing that it neither began nor ended with Menger and Schmoller. De Sousa traces the origins of this debate back to the nineteenth-century historical school of German economics, which (following the literature in economics) she terms "historicist". In contrast to the type of historicism presented in Jacques Bos's contribution -where the term is used to describe a particular historiographical approach -de Sousa's focus is on a type of economic theory that viewed economic phenomena as bound to particular historical time periods. De Sousa argues that this historical approach to economic theory, which often made appeal to concepts such as "Volksgeist", was inherently holistic in its orientation, an approach at odds with the methodological individualism of the Austrian school. The debate touches importantly on the question of the relationship between Erklären and Verstehen, since the notion that individual preferences can explain individual economic behavior and, ultimately, the economy as a whole, presupposes that it is possible to access the preferences that individuals in fact have. In other words, it presupposes that there is some sense in which economists can "understand" what goes on in the minds of individual agents. De Sousa argues, however, that there was no consensus amongst members of the Austrian school on this issue. She suggests that the methodological disagreement between the individualist theoretical approach of the Austrians and the more holistic empirical approach of the Germans also must be seen against the background of conflicting political ideologies, i.e., that of the social reformism of the German national economists vs. the political and economic liberalism of the Austrians.
Max Weber, whose historical sociology places him in a critical position both with respect to the German and the Austrian schools, is commonly credited with having developed a unique notion of Verstehen as a necessary precondition for explanations in the human sciences. According to Weber, explanations of particular historical or social events require some presupposition to the effect that these events are the results of a means-end rationality on the parts of social agents. Our understanding of such an idealized means-end rationality then serves as a norm ("ideal type"), drawing our attention to the necessity of providing explanations where this norm appears to be violated. While Weber's methodological framework is commonly regarded as having been significantly influenced by Heinrich Rickert's analysis of values, the contributions of Michael Heidelberger (Universität Tübingen) and Daniel Ŝuber (Universität Konstanz) call this assumption into question, though in rather different ways. In his contribution, Michael Heidelberger examines the impact on Max Weber of Johannes von Kries's work on the relationship between statistical laws and the attribution of an adequate cause. Heidelberger argues that once we appreciate the central status of von Kries's work in Weber's thinking, we have to recognize that Weber's notion of an "understanding sociology" in fact bears a surprisingly close resemblance to notions of causal explanation that we ordinarily associate with the natural sciences. Contrary to Heidelberger, the contribution by Daniel Ŝuber argues that the impact of Dilthey on the proponents of classical sociology (Max Weber, Georg Simmel, Karl Mannheim) has been much neglected in favor of emphasizing the neo-Kantian elements in sociology. Ŝuber contends that the simplified accounts found in many disciplinary histories of sociology are due to the lack of an adequate understanding of the philosophical positions being debated at the turn of the century. Ŝuber's own methodology is informed by Mannheim's theory of structure, which aims at displaying the logical structure of prior systematizations in a given field of research. He argues that such an analysis reveals that Dilthey's ontology was a holistic one (as opposed to Rickert's dualistic ontology) and that subsequent work in sociology can be shown to bear some marks of Dilthey's holism.
The Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy regained some currency within Englishlanguage debates by the 1940s and 1950s, following the publication in 1942 of Carl Gustav Hempel's "The Function of General Laws in History". In his contribution, "Opposition to Verstehen in Orthodox Logical Empiricism", Thomas Uebel (University of Manchester) situates Hempel's work within the broader historical trajectory of logical empiricists' changing views about the unity of science. Uebel argues that it is necessary to distinguish between not only different stages of logical empiricism, but also different aspects of what was considered problematic about understanding. As Uebel shows, the early logical empiricists' rejection of Verstehen should be seen as (a) a special case of the rejection of intuition as a validational method, and (b) an expression of their logical behaviorism and verificationism. With the relaxation of the latter dogmas by the mid-1930s, logical empiricists began to wonder whether an understanding of mental states could be appealed to in explanations and what status should be accorded to understanding in the context of validating such explanations. After recounting the relevant arguments, Uebel turns to a 1952 paper by Hempel, in which Hempel (importantly drawing on Max Weber's ideal-type method) analyzed at length the relationship between explanation and understanding in both the natural and the human sciences. This analysis, Uebel suggests, leads more or less directly into current discussions in the philosophy of the social sciences.
Concluding Remarks and Acknowledgements
The articles in this volume are based on papers that were presented at the conference Historical Perspectives on Erklären and Verstehen -an Interdisciplinary Workshop, which took place at the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science in Berlin in June, 2006. The aim of the conference was to bring together scholars from various fields to reflect about both the histories and the current status of the dichotomy between explanation and understanding. Like the workshop, this volume tries to address not only the question of how to make sense of a particular set of philosophical concepts (Erklären and Verstehen) by paying attention to the contexts of their emergence, but also how to use these concepts as analytical tools with the aim of gaining some insights into a particular complex of intellectual, social, cultural, scientific and institutional changes that took place around the emerging human sciences from the mid-nineteenth to early twentieth centuries. Clearly, a collected volume such as this one cannot hope to be comprehensive and I am painfully aware of some gaps. For example, a fuller historical treatment of the dichotomy between explanation and understanding would also examine aspects of the histories of psychiatry and psychotherapy, such as Sigmund Freud's psychoanalytic method or Karl Jaspers's understanding psychology. Moreover, while this volume provides some analyses that compare aspects of the German debate with those of other national traditions (Austria, France, Britain, the United States), it also leaves out national contexts, such as Russia or Italy, that would have provided material for further analytical reflection.
This collection of papers should therefore be viewed as opening up a field of analysis and discussion, rather than as providing any definitive answers. Nonetheless, I think it is possible to highlight some findings and questions. Most prominently, it appears that the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen, as underwriting two separate methodological approaches for the natural and the human sciences, had a distinctly German flavor to it. That is to say, while the question of differences and commonalities between the emerging human sciences and other scientific endeavors was also debated in other places, the dividing line between explanation and understanding was apparently not drawn anywhere else as sharply as in the work of (for example) Wilhelm Dilthey. At the same time, however, even within the German (and German language) context, there were other ways of demarcating the natural and the human sciences (a particularly prominent example being the distinction between nomothetic and idiographic methods, coming out of Rickert and Windelband's school of Neo-Kantianism). Moreover, as several contributions to this volume remind us, the continuous branching off of the human sciences into separate disciplines with their own methodological concerns helped to give rise to more general worries about the disintegration of knowledge. These worries, in turn, spurred some to initiate the Unity of Science movement, which would turn out to be especially influential for the development of philosophy of science in North America. We may therefore ask (as Warrren Schmaus does at the end of his contribution) what set of circumstances led to the specifically "German" model of thinking about Verstehen (and its critiques!) as a distinguishing feature of the human sciences, given the many similarities between German and other (e.g., French) approaches to the study of human minds and societies. While there is surely no one right answer to this question, the analyses provided in this volume contribute several pieces of the puzzle, by pointing to educational, religious and political factors at work in mid nineteenth and early twentieth-century Germany. Elaborating further on these analyses, both in comparison with other countries and with respect to the complex interrelations between these and other factors, strikes me as opening up promising topics for future research.
In the same vein, however, we may also remark on the fact that there was certainly no consensus on the significance of the distinction between Erklären and Verstehen within Germany, let alone across the other national and cultural contexts. Moreover, as Roger Smith emphasizes in his contribution, it is not clear that there was no one set of shared questions and concerns associated with this conceptual dichotomy. This observation, too, is brought out clearly in a number of articles in this volume, raising the question of why, in spite of this vagueness, the dichotomy between Erklären and Verstehen has had such tenacity in twentieth-century philosophical discourse. This question has two aspects, one historical and one philosophical, both of which go beyond the scope of what is being presented in this volume, and both of which are well worth investigating further. The historical question is how the dichotomy came to travel from the contexts of its origin to be represented in various fields of contemporary philosophy of mind, action, and science. Important events, in this respect were surely the renewed debates about the philosophy of history in the 1940s and 1950s (this is touched upon in Thomas Uebel's contribution to this volumes) as well as Georg Henrik von Wright's philosophy of action explanation (see Kusch 2003, for a recent reappraisal), but more research into this question is definitely called for. Apart from such specific questions, however, I would like to suggest that it is precisely the heterogeneity of questions and concerns bundled together under the rubric of the Erklären/Verstehen dichotomy that accounts for some of its continuing popularity. This then brings to the fore the philosophical question of what is the current relevance of the distinction. In response to this question, too, I would like to suggest that it is the heterogeneity of usages and philosophical topics behind the conceptual pair of Erklären and Verstehen that makes it hard to dismiss it tout court. Careful and historically informed analysis of the different ways in which notions of explanation and understanding figure in current philosophical debates remains central for systematic philosophical work. Conversely, if used with the requisite historical sensibility these notions can provide analytical tools for intellectual history.
I would like to thank Hans Jörg Rheinberger and the Max Planck Institute for the History of Science for making this project possible, the contributors to this volume for stimulating discussions, John Carson for helpful comments on this introduction, and -last but certainly not least -my assistant, Christine Gross, for the painstaking work she put into proof-reading and assembling the bibliographies for the articles in this volume. The Erklären/Verstehen debates of the late nineteenth century were, as several essays in this collection point out, peculiar to German-speaking Europe. Even when French or British scholars dealt with similar philosophical arguments, an epistemological distinction between two kinds of knowledge -one about human beings and texts, the other about the natural world -never took on the ubiquity or importance that it held in the German context (see Smith and Schmaus, in this volume). Why was this the case? What about the German intellectual scene made the issue of methodological differences between the sciences such an important theme in the second half of the nineteenth century? Any answer to this question would have to include a history of the two other categories used to organize these late nineteenth-century debates -the terms Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft. This binary division of the sciences, still common in German academic discourse today, evolved out of a far more complex set of early nineteenth-century classificatory schemata (Diemer 1968; Flint 1905, 57f.) . Each of these two concepts had early modern precedents, but historians generally agree that this distinction, as a stable feature of German intellectual culture, appeared only around the middle of the nineteenth century (Wise 1983; Veit-Brause 1999; Reill 1994 Reill , 2005 . In its starkest form, this bifurcation has been described, borrowing a term from C. P. Snow, as the rise of "two cultures", one scientific and one scholarly (MacClean 1988; Hörz 1997, 10f.,15) .
Bibliography
As a cause for this new divide, historians have often pointed to the emergence of a more reductionist and mechanistic form of science, typified by the work of figures like Hermann von Helmholtz and Emil DuBois-Reymond (Wise 1983; Veit-Brause 1999). Yet this point of origin is both too specific and chronologically too late. Discussions of the methodological differences between the natural sciences and their humanistic cousins were actually already widespread in the 1840s, well before physicalist physiology was a significant force in German scientific life. Helmholtz himself recognized this fact; he blamed Hegel for the bad blood that had existed for so long between the Natur-and the Geisteswissenschaften (Helmholtz [1862] 1876, 6-11). The real historical force behind this split, however, was something broader than the intellectual aftershocks of a single philosopher's work. This divide within German Wissenschaft first emerged in the context of a lengthy dispute over educational policy that, beginning in the 1820s, set German Naturforscher against many of their colleagues in the humanistic disciplines. These debates dealt, among other things, with the place of the natural sciences in the curriculum of the Gymnasium, the German secondary schools that prepared students for the universities, and this seemingly quotidian issue was in fact of serious importance for the public standing of the natural sciences. The school debates raised the question of how the natural sciences fit into the dominant cultural ideal of Bildung, or self-cultivation, an ideal closely allied with the Gymnasium as an institution (on Bildung, see, Turner 1971; Vierhaus 1972; Koselleck 1990; Olesko 1991, 21-60; Kaschuba 1993; Bollenbeck 1994) . Could the natural sciences be used to cultivate a form of selfhood that was properly gebildet, balanced and harmonious in aesthetic, moral and intellectual terms? For German Naturforscher, the answer to this question needed to be yes.
Much more than narrow bickering about the number of classroom hours assigned a given subject, the school debates encouraged a thorough public vetting of the supposed intellectual and moral benefits of different kinds of knowledge, and it was in this context that a new, binary system for classifying knowledge first became linked with the question of methodological difference. At the heart of these debates was the same basic issue at stake in the later Methodenstreit -namely, whether or not there was a difference between the kind of knowledge one can have about nature and about human beings. Advocates of a curriculum based around the study of Greek and Latin claimed that a philological education provided students with a universal set of intellectual skills that could be readily applied later in life to any other field, including the natural sciences. Naturforscher and many educational reformers, in contrast, argued that knowledge about nature required a unique set of skills, different from the one employed with texts, and as a result, a narrow classical education left future medical doctors and scientists woefully unprepared for their later studies. The conflict between these two camps had two major results. It popularized the idea that Wissenschaft was divided into two basic branches, which already in the 1840s began to take on their later labels, the Naturwissenschaften and the Geisteswissenschaften. It also linked this distinction to epistemological questions; these two branches of Wissenschaft, it became common to argue, were not just different in the topics they covered, but in their forms of knowledge, as well.
"Erklären" and "Verstehen", the key terms of the later nineteenth-century debates, were not as central to the Vormärz discussions, although the words were used occasionally and some of the contrasts drawn between the two branches of Wissenschaft were broadly similar to the arguments of later thinkers. My primary interest in what follows, however, is not to analyze these earlier exchanges as philosophical precursors to later, more famous debates. I hope, instead, to suggest one reason why the question of methodological difference seemed so important to German intellectuals. Through the debates over school reform and Bildung, ideas about moral and intellectual character formation were closely tied to ideas about the structure of knowledge. In order to defend the cultural value of their disciplines, nineteenth-century German Naturforscher needed to answer an epistemic question -what kind of knowledge does your field produce, and what sorts of procedures does it employ? After this question was answered, others followed as a matter of course -how does your kind of knowledge shape its practitioners? What kind of person does it produce? And would that person possesses the necessary intellectual breadth, order and balance to count as truly "gebildet"?
Knowledge and Bildung in the Gymnasium Debates
The dominant educational power in Germany throughout the nineteenth century was neohumanism, a movement that had begun at the end of the preceding century as a kind of cultural revolt, a critique of contemporary life that looked to ancient Greece and Rome as a model for the aesthetic, philosophical and moral regeneration of the present. This loose and diverse movement, woven out of many strands of late eighteenth-century intellectual life, went on to play a central role in the educational policy of the nineteenth century, spreading out from its North German origins to become a powerful force in school policy and in educated culture more broadly (O'Boyle 1968; Jäger 1987; Marchand 1996, 4-35) . By the 1830s, neohumanism was well-established as a bureaucratic ally of Germany's dynastic states, many of whom were trying to standardize the curricula taught in their secondary schools. State officials hoped to bring greater uniformity to an educational landscape characterized by a great deal of local variation, and in their efforts, the rhetoric and pedagogical goals of neohumanism played a leading role. Neohumanist pedagogues captured key bureaucratic posts and successfully preserved the study of Latin and Greek as the centerpiece of preparatory schooling, breathing new life into a curriculum that had come under fire during the Enlightenment (Jäger 1987). In the process, they assured that knowledge of Latin and Greek would continue to be a defining hallmark of the well-educated man (O'Boyle 1968) .
Because of the breadth of neohumanist influence, the period's debates about educational reform were pan-German in scope, sharing a common set of themes and categories despite local and regional differences in school policy. The new school plans followed two basic models across the different German states, and both were heavily weighted towards the study of classical languages. Prussia and most of the middle German states adopted curricular guidelines that included a smattering of "modern" subjects (the natural sciences, for example, and the study of modern languages) alongside Greek and Latin. Bavaria and Austria, in contrast, approved plans that focused almost entirely on classics. In both cases, the natural sciences played only a minor role in the curriculum, and the natural historical fields in particular were especially weakly represented (Jeismann 1987; Schubring 1987; Olesko 1991, 21-60; Bonnekuh 1992) .
For many defenders of the classical curriculum, limiting the time devoted to natural science made sound pedagogical sense. Natural science, orthodox neohumanists claimed, did not possess the necessary intellectual qualities to fulfill the Gymnasium's central purpose -the task of Bildung, or self-cultivation. For example, Christian Grossmann, an educational official in Leipzig, argued that students would never develop the necessary moral and mental character studying a misshapen combination of classical languages and natural science. It could only be to their detriment to spend their formative years wandering between classical texts and natural historical objects, going from "Solon's … laws to baobabs, quartzes and pebbles … from reason to unreason, from the ideals of humanity to the beasts, from the high and the eternal to the changeable, the ordinary, and the trivial." In fact, Grossmann claimed, only a man with a solid early training in the universals of classical language and culture would have the mental and moral capacity necessary for later greatness in the natural sciences. A philological education was the best preparation for future intellectual achievement, regardless of the specific field one hoped to enter. Grossmann cited Herder to the effect that it was "the intensity of the spiritual powers" fostered by their humanist education that had made Francis Bacon, Kepler, Newton, Leibniz, Haller, Euler, Linné, and Buffon the great men -and the great natural researchers -that they were (Grossmann [1834] 1847, 180f.).
The preceding passages capture most of the neohumanists' favorite arguments against the pedagogical benefits of the natural sciences. A philological curriculum supposedly trained students in a set of universally applicable intellectual skills, skills that would allow them to master other subjects with ease later on in their lives. Indeed, a philological education was the best possible kind of intellectual preparation for the future university student. Boys whose future lay in the world of Wissenschaft needed training in abstract, ordered thought, a kind of education otherwise known as "formal Bildung". They needed to master "strict formal relationships" and "strict external lawfulness" (as Gymnasium director Friedrich Lindemann explained), and grammar was the subject most suited to teach students these habits of disciplined, law-governed thought (Grossmann [1834 (Grossmann [ ] 1847 . Learning Latin and Greek initiated students into a set of elegant and internally consistent rules, especially since these languages surpassed modern tongues in the purity and logic of their grammar. (Marchand 1996, 31) .
The classical curriculum was also supposed to mold the student's character, not just his intellect. The major sin neohumanist pedagogy sought to avoid was "one-sidedness" [Einseitigkeit], a lack of intellectual and moral harmony in the personality of the young student. The best way to protect against one-sidedness was for students to spend their time studying subjects that were themselves internally consistent and harmonious, qualities embodied to perfection, so the argument ran, in Greek and Roman culture and in the Greek and Roman languages (Marchand 1996, 28) . The subjects students mastered shaped the structure of their souls, and the natural sciences, according to neohumanist critics, were too utilitarian, too base in their subject matter, and too internally diverse to offer the right moral resources to young students. Even in cases where natural science might merit inclusion as a minor subject, it could never serve as a cornerstone of a Gymnasium education. It did not lend itself to so-called "formal" Bildung, the training in abstract, internally consistent forms of knowledge that was the main goal of a Gymnasium education (e.g., Thiersch 1830; Raschig 1847).
The opposite of formal knowledge was knowledge that was merely "positive" -knowledge that dealt not with law-governed abstractions, but with specific empirical content. Another often-invoked opposition was between the spiritual and the material, with the classical curriculum aligned with the former. The Gymnasium was devoted to training the Geist, and subjects that dealt only with base matter were supposedly ill-suited to that purpose. While material or positive knowledge might be valuable, it was out of step with the Gymnasium's primary mission. The so-called Realien, disciplines like modern history, the natural sciences, and modern languages, were first and foremost kinds of positive knowledge, and these subjects, according to neohumanist orthodoxy, had their proper place in the Realschule or Bürgerschule, secondary schools intended for students who would not continue on to the university (Thiersch 1830; Grossmann [1834] 1847; Raschig 1847).
While the study of languages held pride of place, many neohumanists believed that there was another body of knowledge that met the criteria for generality and internal consistency they required in a Gymnasium subject -mathematics. Along with the classical languages, mathematics was also a respectable medium for formal Bildung, and for many neohumanists, mathematics served as a sufficient proxy for the natural sciences as a whole. Math was "the grammar of natural phenomenon" (Lindemann 1834, 22), and like grammar, it provided " a system of laws." What grammar offered for the realm of the human spirit, mathematics provided for nature, and the pedagogical benefits of these two subjects were assumed to be similar (Snell 1833; Lindemann 1834).
Even mathematics, however, was not safe from criticism. Given its association with mechanical, practical tasks, it was not always considered morally elevated enough to be a means of formal Bildung. When asked in 1843 about plans to expand the mathematical curriculum in Weimar's Gymnasium, for example, the majority of the philosophical faculty of Jena concluded that the plan was a bad idea. Realschulen and technical institutes were the proper place for mathematics, and mathematics, in their minds, was already overvalued in the Gymnasium. As evidence for this assertion, they pointed to the fact that where teachers had once written qualitative evaluations of their students, they now recorded numerical grades. Under such a grading system, the professors complained, the student saw "his whole personality reduced to a few heartless numbers" (Philosophische Fakultät [1843 ] 1992 .
A critique of numerical grading might seem, at first glance, an odd answer to a question about the recommended content of school curriculum, but there was a certain logic in the Jena faculty's response. The link between these two issueshow students were evaluated and what they were taught -lay in the question of moral character. How does someone trained to place high value on mathematics approach the world? Reductively, the professors worried, and without the necessary attention to the individual human personality.
Neohumanists' criticisms of natural science did not go unanswered; not surprisingly, they provoked a sustained and often angry response. The announcement of the Bavarian school plan in 1829, for example, happened to coincide with the annual meeting of the Gesellschaft deutscher Naturforscher und Aerzte in Heidelberg, and it caused a universal uproar at the meeting. The school plan, crafted by the philologist Friedrich Thiersch, contained no natural science at all, a fact that inspired outrage among the Naturforscher assembled in Heidelberg. Lorenz Oken reported that everywhere he went at the meeting, people were complaining about the new Bavarian curriculum (Oken 1829).
Men as intellectually distant from one another as Lorenz Oken and Justus Liebig, though they agreed on little else, saw eye-to-eye on this one issue, and found, in the neohumanists' pedagogical agenda, a common enemy. Both of these men -Oken, the aging hero of Romantic science, and Liebig, the vocal critic of Naturphilosophie -complained about the overweening ambition of philologists who sought to promote their own form of Bildung as the golden standard by which all other kinds of knowledge should be measured. Oken had been attacking classical educational ideals since the early nineteenth century (Oken 1809, 13f.) , and in the Vormärz he used his journal Isis to complain about marginal role of natural science in the schools (Oken 1829). Similarly, Liebig's famous 1840 speech on chemistry in Prussia, long seen as defining document for the "new" science that followed the Romantic era (Heuser and Zott 1992), was structured through and through by the school debates. The speech has been read primarily as an attack on Naturphilosophie (which it was), but it was also an attack on neohumanist pedagogy. Liebig contrasted the characteristics of the Naturforscher with those of the Philolog, arguing that the natural sciences would train a "newer, more powerful generation" than the one raised on philological learning; he ended the speech with an extended attack on the neohumanist model of the Gymnasium (Liebig 1840, 11-21, 43-47) .
But how, precisely, did the issue of method fit into the debates over school curriculum and Bildung? The first step towards answering that question is to ask what mid-nineteenth-century Germans included under discussions of Methodologie. Methodologie was, in fact, a recognized branch of philosophy in this period, one covered most frequently in propaedeutic works that provided an introductory overview of a given field like medicine or theology, or that covered Wissenschaft as a whole. Carl Schmid described his 1810 work Allgemeine Encyklopädie und Methodologie der Wissenschaften as a contribution to "die Wissenschaft der Wissenschaften." This "science of the sciences" had two branches. Encyklopädie was its "objective side"; that is, it described the objects of scientific inquiry. Methodologie was its "subjective side", or "the Wissenschaft of the study of the Wissenschaften." In other words, methodology described how scientific knowledge was produced ("subjective" in this context referred to the knowing subject, the person who possessed or made knowledge) (Schmid 1810, iv) . Encyklopädie dealt with the "what" (what external object does this science explore?); Methodologie with the "how" (how does one, as a knowing subject, create knowledge about this object?). In addition to general works like Schmid's, which covered all of the sciences, similar books were common in university disciplines like medicine, and lectures on "Encyklopädie und Methodologie" were also offered as university courses, both within the professional faculties and as a general introduction to university study (e.g., Universität Halle 1829-1840; Wagner 1838; Heusinger 1839).
In their treatment of method, works of Encyklopädie und Methodologie took a strongly anthropological approach. Methodologie was a science of personas as well as a science of processes. In addition to epistemological procedures, these works discussed the personality traits and specific skills needed in a given field. For example, one of the rare treatments of the natural sciences in this genre, Gustav Suchow's obscure Systematische Encyklopädie und Methodologie der theoretischen Naturwissenschaft included under its discussion of Methodologie two sections: one on "general methodology" and one on "Requirements for Natural Scientific Study". The latter included things such as a healthy body and good sense organs, a gift for observation and a good memory (Suchow 1839).
Methodologie, as a matter of course, dealt with personal qualities, the concrete competencies and character traits necessary to practice a certain science or profession. What kind of person was best suited for a certain kind of Wissenschaft? And how, in turn, did the practice of natural science, philology, or history shape the individual personality? These were all questions that Methodologie sought to answer. Discussions of method and discussions of Bildung, in other words, covered overlapping intellectual ground, and the issues raised in the school debates blended easily into questions of method. Indeed, proper method had been the rallying cry of neohumanists since the late eighteenth century. When philologists argued for the universality of a classical education, they often did so by citing the universality of the "method" this education imparted; it provided a set of basic intellectual capacities that could be used to advantage in any branch of Wissenschaft (Turner 1983, 460-462) . This claim, as the primary one Naturforscher needed to counter, gave the representatives of the natural sciences increased incentive to emphasize the particularity of their own forms of knowledge, the unique intellectual benefits offered by the study of nature.
History, Natural Science and Method in the School Debates
Questions about the structure of knowledge, then, were central to the education debates, with the issue of methodology never far from center stage. By the mid-1840s, s widespread discussion had emerged about the differences between the natural and the philological sciences. One of the clearest formulations of this supposed difference came from writings of a classical philologist, Hermann Köchly, a liberal young schoolteacher who published a number of works on the Gymnasium question. Köchly took a particularly strong stance on the differences between the natural and the historical sciences, and as a result, the responses his proposals inspired offer a useful survey of the various intellectual options on the table in Vormärz debates over the classification of knowledge. Köchly's proposed reforms, which took as their starting point an assumed methodological difference between the natural and the historical sciences, were both controversial and widely discussed. By the late 1840s, the young Saxon schoolteacher had a national reputation, and in 1848, he was elected the provisional chair of the first meeting of the Allgemeine Deutsche Lehrerversammlung. After the revolutions of 1848-1849, his reputation as a school reformer helped win him the chair of classical philology at the University of Zurich (Böckel 1904, 53, 91-102) .
In opposition to many of his colleagues, Köchly argued that there were two distinct forms of education that could prepare students for future work in the world of Wissenschaft; consequently, there ought to be two separates types of secondary schools. The traditional Gymnasium could train students for later careers in the historical sciences, which included philology, history, theology and law, while the Realschule would prepare students for university study in the natural sciences and medicine. Both kinds of schools, contrary to contemporary practice, should be accorded equal prestige and status (Köchly 1845, 4).
In the early 1840s, Köchly had been part of the same Dresden literary circle as the liberal Young Hegelian Arnold Ruge (Böckel 1904, 29-31) , and Köchly relied on Hegel to justify his plan for a new, dual-track school system. While Wissenschaft itself was unified, Köchly argued, it had two primary objects, "Natur" and "Geist". Nature was characterized by "its cyclically recurring states"; the realm of spirit, in contrast, by "progressive development" (Köchly 1845, 4; Köchly 1846, 47; on Hegel's original use of these categories, Pinkard 2002, 266-304) . Johann Gustav Droysen, traditionally seen as a seminal figure in the history of historical methodology, later used this same distinction in his famous essay "Natur und Geschichte" (Wise and Norton 1983) , and this parallel usage was one of several congruencies between the careers of these two historians. Droysen also had ties to Young Hegelian circles in the 1830s and 1840s, and, during the same period, he criticized classical philology's excessive focus on language at the expense of historical development (MacClean 1982, 352f .) -another central tenet of Köchly's writings, as we shall shortly see.
Like Droysen, Köchly went beyond an initial topical distinction to argue that the two branches of Wissenschaft were also methodologically distinct. The natural sciences had "a strictly observational and demonstrative method" that was unique to them (Köchly 1847c, 25), and extensive historical training would be wasted on future Naturforscher. Philological training provided them with the wrong kind of "Gymnastik des Geistes"; Naturforscher needed a bodily and sensory education that textual study could not provide, since the study of nature involved learning to move from concrete sensory experience to the abstractions of natural law. Future historians, theologians and lawyers, in contrast, needed to learn to bring the abstractions presented to them in texts into dynamic relationship with their own concrete inner lives. The highest calling of the historical sciences was to provide a vibrant understanding of the past (Köchly 1846, 59-62).
Köchly's ideas about historical method were at the heart of his criticism of the contemporary Gymnasium. Standard teaching methods, he claimed, failed to fulfill the Gymnasium's stated aims of altclassische Bildung. Instead of imbuing students with the spirit of ancient Greece and Rome, as early neohumanists had intended, the classical high schools simply provided language training. Education in the classics had lost its way in linguistic minutiae, and it needed to be thoroughly reformed to provide students with a deep historical understanding of the ancient world. Language study should be a means to an end, not an end in itself. Properly handled, the classical languages provided the conduit through which students came to know the great cultures of Greece and Rome, but if Greek and Latin were taught with dead, philological precision rather than living historical understanding, they were dull tools for training young minds. (This criticism was not an uncommon one; see [Grafton 1983; La Vopa 1990] ). Köchly's historical approach to teaching the classics was well-received in reform circles (Mager 1846; Fuchs 1846, 317; "Geschichte und Verhandlungen" 1847, 50) . He presented his proposals as a defense of the philological tradition, a way of saving philology from itself by countering the current "piling on of so-called Realien" and remedying the "lack of respect, not to say the general derision, in which the public opinion of today holds philology and philologists" (Köchly 1845, vi).
Köchly's reform plans presented, in a particularly stark form, a distinction that was already common in much that had been previously written about school reform. In describing the internal divisions of Wissenschaft, earlier pedagogical writers had often used the opposition between Geist and Natur or between an inner, spiritual and an outer, material world to analyze the different components of the school curriculum (e.g., Snell 1833, 19; Lindemann 1834, 21f., 41-43). Köchly's suggestion that the two halves of Wissenschaft needed to be taught in two separate schools gave institutional flesh and blood to an older philosophical division; the differences between the two kinds of Wissenschaft were so great, his reform plan assumed, that they required two separate kinds of Bildung from very early in life.
Although Köchly's use of this distinction was not unique, he assigned it a practical significance that went beyond the norm, and reviews of his early books acknowledged the relative novelty of his suggestions. Commentators saw Köchly's work as part of a more general innovation, not only in school policy, but also in the categorization of knowledge. Karl Mager's review of Köchly's first book, for example, grouped it with two others, both by small-town school directors, who made similar arguments about the internal differences between the Wissenschaften. Mager opposed Köchly's plan for two separate kinds of secondary schools (he felt that Naturforscher also needed a measure of erudition), but he accepted the epistemological division Köchly had proposed and considered the use of such categories a helpful recent development. "It is nice," Mager wrote, "that the distinction between the Naturwissenschaften and the ethical Wissenschaften is beginning to be common." (Mager 1846, 58-62, 66 ) Other reviews mentioned Köchly's new system of classification as noteworthy, and argued with him over the appropriate labels for the two branches ("Ueber Gymnasialreform" 1845 1239f.; "Schul-und Unterrichtswesen" 1846, 60; A.A 1847, 2).
Despite its roots in Idealist philosophy, then, this binary division of Wissenschaft was clearly considered relatively new in the 1840s. The label "Naturwissenschaft" was used fairly universally, but there was more disagreement about what to call the disciplines on the other side of the divide. Köchly himself preferred the term "historical sciences" because it emphasized the "unique method of the Geisteswissenschaften", which he considered the most important source of their distinctiveness. The precise label used, however, was something that Köchly considered inessential -the division was clear, whatever one chose to call the two fields. At one point he listed six different possible sets of terms that might be used to describe the two main branches of Wissenschaft (Geisteswissenschaften and Naturwissenschaften, the ethical and the physical sciences, the humanistic and the realistic, the historical and the exact, the spiritual and the sensual, the traditional and the experimental). Whatever labels one used, the fields of history, law and theology belonged on one side of a divide; the sciences that dealt with nature lay on the other (Köchly 1847a, 113, 129f.) .
Not everyone agreed with Köchly's specific proposals, but, given the dividing lines produced by the school debates, the basic distinctions he used were beginning to seem increasingly like common sense to educated Germans by the mid-1840s. Köchly's relative nonchalance about terminology makes it clear that there was much more than just a philosophical distinction at stake. The categories Naturwissenschaft and Geisteswissenschaft (or their various equivalents) functioned as placeholders for the interests of different groups of scholars, teachers and students; they were practical tools to address issues of status and identity in a key social institution.
Among Naturforscher, the most intense discussions of Köchly's proposals took place in the schoolteacher's home city of Dresden, where, in 1846, he helped found a society for school reform, the Gymnasialverein. Köchly's own proposals offered a starting point for the Gymnasialverein's work. He summarized the issue before the society as follows: the question was whether "depending on whether they deal with the development of the Geist itself, or the objects of external nature, the sciences break apart into historical or ethical sciences on the one hand and natural sciences on the other." Whether it made sense to have two different forms of Gymnasien to correspond to these two different branches of Wissenschaft was the next question, Köchly thought, that followed from this conclusion ("Geschichte und Verhandlungen" 1847, 59f.).
Several Dresden Naturforscher joined the Gymnasialverein, and all of them held strong, if varying, views on Köchly's proposal. The three most prominent and vocal natural scientific members of the society were Hermann Richter, a professor at the local medical academy; Ludwig Reichenbach, the director of Dresden's botanical garden; and Emil Roßmäßler, a forestry professor from nearby Tharandt. None of these men were among the most eminent of German researchers, but all went on to positions of some national importance in the second half of the nineteenth century. Reichenbach was later elected head of the national scientific association the Leopoldina ("Nekrolog" 1879), Roßmäßler was one of the foremost scientific popularizers of the nineteenth century (Daum 1998, 203-209; Daum 2002) , and Richter was a leading figure in the national movement for medical reform (Richter 1964) .
The positions these men took on the question of school reform had important similarities, but also equally important differences, both in tone and content.
Richter was perhaps the most acerbic and combative member of the Gymnasialverein, and also a strident defender of Köchly's proposed split. Richter had been interested in epistemological issues from early on in his career; his dissertation had examined the question of certainty in medical thought, a problem he tackled in conjunction with a careful study of Francis Bacon (he recommended the creation of Codex empiricus in which medical propositions could be collated with relevant observations) (Grosse 1896, 14; Böckel 1904, 51) . At the Dresden medical academy he was an aggressive spokesman for a reformed, "rational medicine". An admirer of the Younger Viennese School and the methods of physiologist Johannes Müller, he antagonized some of his older colleagues, men he derided as aging medical Romantics (Richter 1964, 7, 25-30) .
Richter agreed with Köchly that there was a clear methodological distinction between the two branches of Wissenschaft, but he had less than flattering things to say about Köchly's own field of classical philology. "The natural sciences have a completely different teaching and research method," he stated, "and it stands in relation to the humanistic method as oil does to water" (Richter 1847a, viii; Richter 1848, 105). The natural sciences allowed the student to learn to follow the logic of, as Richter put it, "things which can speak for themselves", while the traditional humanist curriculum only taught them to follow authority. Studying the classics cultivated, both literally and figuratively, a kind of blindness. The natural sciences taught students to see the world clearly, and hence provided, Richter thought, the perfect foundation for a new liberal political order. An education in the natural sciences would "give every student the ability to look around with a trained eye and an independently thinking spirit at all of the living relations around him", and give him the courage to sweep away all that was dead and sickly in the current political system (Richter 1847b, 55).
Fellow society member Ludwig Reichenbach defended natural science from a very different political and philosophical perspective; he held many of the Romantic commitments that were anathema to Richter. The main scientific accomplishment of Reichenbach's career had been a system of botanical classification similar to those proposed by other Naturphilosophen of his generation (Jardine 1996) , and the botany professor spoke of Oken and Schelling with approval in the Gymnasialverein's debates. Reichenbach also drew very different conclusions than did Richter about the meaning of science for social and political order. As a close confidant of the Saxon King Friedrich August II, Reichenbach believed the natural sciences would restore faith in traditional monarchy. He had argued in the early 1840s that the study of nature would create "devoted, peace-loving citizens", convinced of the beneficent rights of "the strong and the powerful" to rule, and he repeated this argument in his speeches in the Gymnasialverein (Reichenbach 1843, 88; Reichenbach 1847a, 13).
Reichenbach and Richter also disagreed about the relationship of natural science to the humanist tradition. Reichenbach, in addition to promoting the virtues of natural science, also praised the traditional classical curriculum, complaining about the excessive pull of "Realismus", neohumanism's pedagogical enemy, in current public discussions (Reichenbach 1847a, 16; "Geschichte und Verhandlungen" 1847, 61-67) . Richter, in contrast, considered the traditional curriculum more or
